Offense Variable 19 (OV 19) measures threats to the security of a penal institution or court, use of force against administration of justice, and interference with or attempts to interfere with the administration of justice. Unlike most offense variables, OV 19 expressly authorizes consideration of conduct occurring after the sentencing offense is completed. MCL 777.49; People v Smith, 488 Mich 193 (2010). OV 19 is scored for all felony offenses. MCL 777.22.
Scoring Table
| Points | Scoring Provision |
|---|---|
| 25 | The offender by his or her conduct threatened the security of a penal institution or court. MCL 777.49(a). |
| 15 | The offender used force or the threat of force against another person or the property of another person to interfere with, or that results in the interference with, the administration of justice or the rendering of emergency services. MCL 777.49(b). |
| 10 | The offender otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice, or directly or indirectly violated a personal protection order. MCL 777.49(c). [PPO provision added by 2018 PA 652, effective March 28, 2019] |
| 0 | The offender did not threaten the security of a penal institution or court or interfere with or attempt to interfere with the administration of justice or the rendering of emergency services. MCL 777.49(d). |
| No McGraw Restriction: OV 19 expressly includes events occurring after completion of the sentencing offense. People v Smith, 488 Mich 193 (2010). This is the express exception to the McGraw general rule. | |
Foundational Rules — The McGraw Exception and Definition of Interference
The Supreme Court held that OV 19 may be scored for conduct that occurred after the sentencing offense was completed. Because the circumstances described in OV 19 expressly include events occurring after a felony has been completed, the variable provides for the consideration of post-offense conduct. Ten points were properly scored for witness intimidation conduct occurring days after the defendant's manslaughter offense was completed.
The Supreme Court established that "a defendant's denial of culpability — without more — does not slow or prevent a criminal investigation or constitute an effort to do so." Interference with the administration of justice requires something more than a suspect's denial of culpability. Actions that rise to the level of interference include: (1) actively redirecting the investigation; (2) attempting to or successfully concealing evidence; (3) attempting to or successfully preventing witnesses from testifying; and (4) attempting to or successfully preventing law enforcement from arresting the defendant. Mere denial does not qualify, and imposing a penalty for denial raises constitutional concerns regarding the defendant's right to maintain innocence.
The phrase "interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice" encompasses more than just the actual judicial process and includes pre-charge conduct. Specifically, providing a false name to a police officer who stopped the defendant's car for crossing a fog line constitutes interference with the administration of justice for purposes of OV 19. The investigation of crime is critical to the administration of justice. This decision vacated the contrary ruling in People v Deline, 254 Mich App 595 (2002).
The plain and ordinary meaning of "interfere with the administration of justice" under OV 19 is "to oppose so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering judgment of individuals or causes by judicial process." This encompasses conduct before criminal charges are filed, acts constituting obstruction of justice, and acts that do not necessarily rise to the level of a chargeable offense. However, OV 19 does not contemplate failure to facilitate an investigation — only actual interference or attempted interference. Violations of probation and failure to pay child support do not qualify.
25-Point Score — Threats to Security of Penal Institution
A 25-point score under OV 19 requires a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant by his or her conduct threatened the security of a penal institution or court. The court must find: (1) that the defendant engaged in some conduct; and (2) that the conduct threatened the security of the prison. Constructive possession alone and hypothetical threats are insufficient. The defendant was found near a cell phone with a charger in a shared prison cell, but there was no evidence the phone was operational or that he used it — 25 points were not supported.
Twenty-five points were properly scored where the defendant-inmate awaiting trial attempted to smuggle controlled substances into the jail, and when discovered, struck and injured another inmate he believed had informed on him. The smuggling of controlled substances into a jail is a threat to the security of a penal institution because of the dangers of controlled substances to users and those around them. The retaliatory attack on a fellow inmate threatened jail security by causing disruption and potentially discouraging other inmates from reporting security breaches.
It was improper to assess 25 points for OV 19 where the sentencing offense was possession of various controlled substances found during jail intake. Mere possession of drugs at the time of arrest and during intake was an insufficient basis to assess 25 points for threatening the security of a penal institution. The police found the drugs during intake before the defendant was processed further into the jail, and there was no evidence he possessed the drugs with intent to bring them inside.
Where the defendant held onto the leg of an officer attempting to move him to another cell, to the point where other officers had to leave their posts to assist and other prisoners were ordered to return to their cells, the defendant's actions threatened the security of the jail and supported 25 points.
15-Point Score — Force or Threat of Force
While fleeing the police, the defendant broke into a camper to hide. Fifteen points are permitted under OV 19 where the offender used force against the property of another. The police officer's act of breaking a window to enter would not qualify because the statute requires the offender to have used force; however, the defendant's act of opening the door and entering the camper — constituting a breaking under Michigan law — was force against another's property sufficient to support 15 points.
OV 19 was properly scored at 15 points where the defendant told the victim that he knew who she was, that his associates had been watching her, and required the victim to promise not to contact the police as a precondition to releasing her. This constituted the use of threat of force to interfere with or attempt to interfere with the administration of justice.
In a robbery case, OV 19 was properly scored at 15 points based on the defendant's altercation with loss prevention officers and other employees because those private persons were authorized to make an arrest pursuant to MCL 764.16(d) and were thus acting in the administration of justice. Force used against persons authorized to make a citizen's arrest qualifies for the 15-point score.
Pointing a gun at the victim and telling him not to call the police, and removing all phones from the home while fleeing, establish threat of force sufficient to warrant 15 points. The defendant's conduct was specifically aimed at preventing the victim from contacting law enforcement.
Where the defendant assaulted a homeowner while gaining access to the home in the course of fleeing from the police, 15 points are appropriate for use of force against another person to interfere with the administration of justice.
10-Point Score — Otherwise Interfering with Administration of Justice
Ten points were properly assessed under OV 19 where the defendant made statements plainly intended to deceive law enforcement during the investigation, including attempting to convince investigators that the complainant was fabricating accusations due to her medications, insinuating she had falsely accused others before, and misleading police about his physical ability to commit the crimes. This went beyond merely denying the allegations or maintaining innocence and constituted active deception aimed at leading investigators astray.
OV 19 was properly scored on the basis that the defendant asked others to dispose of the knife used to stab the victim and to lie about his whereabouts in an attempt to create a false alibi. Asking others to conceal evidence and provide false alibis constitutes interference with the administration of justice. The McGraw rule does not apply to OV 19.
Ten points were properly assessed under OV 19 where the defendant created a website and made social media posts intended to deter the complainant from pursuing criminal sexual assault charges against the defendant's son. Even though the complainant ultimately did go to the police, OV 19 does not require actual interference — attempted interference is sufficient. The defendant specifically stated she wanted the victim to tell police officers that she lied, and the evidence supported an inference that the social media campaign was designed to intimidate the victim and undermine her credibility.
Ten points were properly scored under OV 19 where the defendant fled on foot after police ordered him to "freeze." Fleeing from police can easily become interference with the administration of justice, particularly where there was an effective command for the defendant to stop in the form of a direct police order. This decision was vacated in part on other grounds, but the OV 19 analysis remains instructive.
Ten points were appropriately scored where the defendant was still fumbling inside another person's vehicle as if trying to start it after police issued commands to freeze. Ignoring police commands and continuing criminal activity in the face of law enforcement direction constitutes interference with the administration of justice.
Absconding while on bond, thereby forcing an adjournment of the trial date, constitutes interference with the administration of justice sufficient to support 10 points under OV 19.
Cases Where Interference Was Not Established
It was error to assess 10 points for OV 19 based on the defendant's refusal to consent to a blood draw under the implied consent law. The refusal was expressly permitted by MCL 257.625a and MCL 257.625c, upon penalty of a suspended license and points — the statute contemplates that an arrestee may refuse, and such lawful refusal cannot constitute interference with the administration of justice. Holding otherwise would implicate constitutional concerns regarding warrantless searches.
The fact that at the time the defendant committed the sentencing offense of methamphetamine possession, he was also in violation of his parole for failure to report, does not support scoring OV 19 at 10 points. OV 19 is generally scored for conduct constituting an attempt to avoid being caught and held accountable for the sentencing offense. The defendant was arrested immediately after being discovered with meth; his parole violation at the time had no effect on the process of investigating, trying, and convicting him for that offense.
Two rulings: (1) The trial court correctly determined that OV 19 should not be assigned 10 points for lying to medical services personnel — MCL 777.49(c) does not contain any reference to otherwise interfering with emergency services. (2) Zero points were correctly scored for a false statement to the police where the defendant was in post-operative recovery suffering the effects of anesthesia when she gave the statement. Statements made while impaired by medication may not support interference scoring.
The trial court erred in assessing 10 points for OV 19 where the defendant merely ran away when he saw the police, without disobeying any demand to stop. If merely attempting to evade capture constitutes interference with the administration of justice, OV 19 would have to be scored in virtually every case. The alternative to running would be to stand still and await capture, which is not required to avoid an interference penalty.
The trial court erred when it scored 10 points where the defendant ran from plain-clothes officers and dropped a gun next to a porch. Immediate flight from police may be suggestive of wrongdoing, but it does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing, and the defendant was not ordered to remain or told not to run. Without an effective command to stop being disobeyed, flight alone is insufficient.
Error to score 10 points for OV 19 based on the judge's belief that the defendant perjured himself at trial, where the judge failed to find and explain how the inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony constituted "willful, material, and flagrant perjury" as required for scoring. The jury's rejection of the defendant's testimony does not, standing alone, mean he attempted to interfere with the administration of justice. See also People v Baiz, unpublished per curiam opinion, issued January 9, 2007 (Docket No. 262912) (same rule applied to trial testimony).
OV 19 was improperly scored at 10 points despite evidence that the defendant had lost 100 pounds and changed his head and facial hairstyle because there was no evidence that these changes in appearance were for the purpose of preventing his identification by witnesses. Circumstantial appearance changes must be shown to be undertaken for the specific purpose of evading identification.
The defendant's failure to register as a sex offender does not constitute interference with the administration of justice under OV 19. The failure to comply with registration requirements, while itself a crime, does not qualify as interference with or attempted interference with the administration of justice within the meaning of MCL 777.49(c).
Endnotes
- People v Smith, 488 Mich 193 (2010)
- People v Deweerd, 511 Mich 979 (2023)
- People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283 (2004)
- People v Hershey, 303 Mich App 330 (2013)
- People v Dixon, 509 Mich 170 (2022)
- People v Carpenter, 322 Mich App 523 (2018)
- People v Hines, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 363151)
- People v Walker, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 27, 2021 (Docket No. 352325)
- People v Smith, 318 Mich App 281 (2016)
- People v McDonald, 293 Mich App 292 (2011)
- People v Passage, 277 Mich App 175 (2007)
- People v Gregory, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 5, 2021 (Docket No. 351777)
- People v Smith, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 7, 2021 (Docket No. 347604)
- People v Muniz, 353 Mich App 437 (2022)
- People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192 (2010)
- People v Dingee, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 365531)
- People v Ratcliff, 299 Mich App 625 (2013)
- People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29 (2021)
- People v Kienutske, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 20, 2021 (Docket No. 351555)
- People v Teike, 348 Mich App 520 (2023)
- People v Sours, 315 Mich App 346 (2016)
- People v Portellos, 298 Mich App 431 (2012)
- People v Gajos (On Reconsideration), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 3, 2009 (Docket No. 281344)
- People v Bohanen, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 26, 2013 (Docket No. 304847)
- People v Frechette, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 25, 2024 (Docket No. 360905)
- People v Baiz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 9, 2007 (Docket No. 262912)
- People v Arney, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2003 (Docket No. 236875)
- People v Welch, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 14, 2014 (Docket Nos. 315782 and 316029)
- People v Underwood II, 278 Mich App 334 (2008)
- People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120 (2009)